INFECTIOUS DISEASE, PRODUCTIVITY, AND SCALE IN OPEN AND CLOSED ANIMAL PRODUCTION SYSTEMS Introduction
In December 2003, a Washington State dairy cow was identified as having bovine spongiform encephalopathy. The cow had originally entered the United States in an 81-animal shipment from Canada. An investigation by the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) into what ultimately happened to this shipment concluded after accounting for only 29 animals (APHIS 2004) . Recent inquiries by Skaggs et al. (2004) into the subsequent histories of Mexican live cattle imports to the United States also point to data inadequacies. These cases give testimony to the openness of bovine agriculture in North America and to the information problems this openness can generate. Tables 1 and 2 summarize the extent of internal flows (United States) and international flows of some of the main husbanded species.
Today, world trade is significantly larger than it was in the 1970s. For pigs, U.S. domestic and international flows have increased markedly since 1990. There are many reasons for these flows, including policy motives, regional economic growth patterns, and cultural issues. One important reason is that animal feed requirements change with animal maturity. Feed is bulky, and it is often more profitable to move young animals closer to the feed source rather than transport the feed. In recent years, U.S. feeder pigs have tended to move from the Atlantic South (North Carolina) and Canada to be fattened in the Corn Belt. Feeder cattle tend to move from the sparse West to the Midwest and Great Plains (Shields and Matthews 2003) . There are also specialist trades in replacement dairy cows, poultry chicks, and laying hens. These animal flows are subject to some regulations, in large part because of disease risks that affect productivity and sometimes may affect human health.
Our main thesis in this paper is that openness matters in the presence of communicable diseases. We address two related issues having to do with the extent of openness in animal production systems. We provide a simple formal model of the tension between regional comparative advantage as a motive for animal trade and efficiency losses due to higher incidence of infectious diseases under open trade. The model characterizes the Nash equilibrium (NE) set and provides suggestions on when it would be socially optimal to regulate the feeder animal trade. There can be a unique equilibrium or multiple stable equilibria, depending on how the extent of infection affects the productivity of the closed system relative to the open system. Supply response to a cost increase can be positive. In our model, too, it is optimal to restrict trade whenever market equilibrium comprises a mix of open and closed system farms.
We then turn to the consequences of sourcing, sorting, and disease husbandry decisions for efficiency and scale in fattening. We find that the risk of realizing a communicable disease within a feedlot discourages the exploitation of technical economies of scale.
But the relationship between scale and animal health class may not be monotone, a consequence of interanimal dependencies when animals infect each other. These dependencies
Infectious Disease, Productivity, and Scale in Open and Closed Animal Production Systems / 3 also motivate sorting in feeder animal markets. Contracts to procure animals through private parties, rather than through open market sourcing, will likely decrease systemic disease risk and increase production scale. In addition, the model allows us to conclude that a ban on a damage-control input may decrease lot scale. After providing case studies of managing communicable animal disease, the paper concludes with a brief discussion.
Animal Movements and Communicable Disease Externalities
Countries coordinate efforts to eradicate diseases that pose the most significant threats to animal production systems and human health (Otte, Nugent, and McLeod 2004) . Table 3 summarizes some of the more important transboundary animal diseases. Institutions involved in global efforts to control communicable animal diseases include public veterinary services at the national and regional levels, the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the United Nations, and the Office International des Épizooties (OIE).
To be successful in eradicating an infectious disease, the most effective strategy is often to cull all herds with infected animals, leave the production facilities idle for a sufficiently long duration, and strictly observe herds in a given radius around an infected farm. Controls often include forbidding transportation of animals from the farm and restricting trade with a region or country. Human travel may also be discouraged, perhaps by denying permission to hold sports events, animal fairs, cultural events, and elections.
Because events surrounding outbreaks of diseases (listed in Table 3 ) can directly affect the daily lives of whole societies, outbreaks are widely reported. Many other infectious animal diseases that are not as widely publicized also cause considerable economic losses. There are several ways in which animal diseases affect the productivity of a herd.
Apart from mortality, depressed productivity may lead to low feed conversion efficiency, reproductive losses, poor product quality, early culling of breeding and dairy stock, and reduced efficiency of management effort.
The formal economics literature on animal disease externalities is sparse. Most studies have been done in the field of veterinary science and consist in estimating the cost of production losses due to a disease. An early FAO (1962) study estimated that losses due to disease amounted to 15 percent of total livestock output in developed countries and 30 percent in less-developed countries. A study of health and fertility problems in dairying (Dijkhuizen 1990 ) assessed losses equal to 10 percent of gross production value. Bennett (2003) estimated the annual value of output loss and input expenditure with treatment and prevention costs for 30 diseases of livestock in Great Britain at about 3.2 percent of the value of animal production.
McInerney (1996) developed a model that recognizes that the cost of disease is a composite loss due to disease and cost of treatment. Animal diseases are modeled in the primal production function as lowering the productivity index, and we follow this approach. The model has been applied in the study of controlling infectious disease on dairy farms in Canada by Chi et al. (2002) . A limitation for policy purposes is that these models do not address the role of disease externalities, namely, the divergence between private and public consequences of actions. 1 This is important because if equilibrium is to be understood in the presence of contagion then one must establish when private actions are consistent with the actions of others. Economic inquiries into control of infectious diseases among humans have related equilibrium rates of infection under selfish behavior to economic policies (Geoffard and Philipson 1996, 1997; Kremer 1996) . However, their models provide little guidance for animal health maintenance because humans are not traded and are largely free to behave as they will.
Empirical models to simulate the spread of contagious transboundary diseases include McCauley et al. (1979); Mangen, Nielsen, and Burrell (2002) ; Matthews et al. (2003) ; Mintiens et al. (2003); and Schoenbaum and Disney (2003) . While useful in forecasting the spread of disease and analyzing the effectiveness of different intervention strategies, these models do not directly recognize the decision problem at the farm level-that private incentives must be in place to promote private decisions that are in the public interest. 2 To close the gap that exists in the disease literature, we develop a simple model that provides insight into regulating communicable animal diseases.
Model
Two types of commercial animal production systems exist. These are a closed (integrated) system that fattens animals from birth, and an open (specialist) system in which feeder animals are produced at one location and fattened at a second. Both systems involve a continuum of competitive firms that produce fattened animals who are at risk for contracting a communicable chronic disease that reduces output. There is free entry from a large pool of potential producers and each producing firm has unit capacity. Fraction 
where P is the product market price. The market demand function is ( ) P Q with
The number of producing firms adjusts to match supply with demand.
Open System
In the open system it costs w to procure a feeder animal. 
where product price is as under the closed system and free entry balances supply with demand.
Competition and Equilibrium
The context is an infinite-player, two-strategy game in which the growers choose between closed-system and open-system procurement. The respective payoffs are as given in equations (1) and (2). We consider only pure strategy NE because a non-trivial, mixed strategy will always be dominated by a pure strategy.
Equilibrium may be described as a pair 
where 1 θ > is assured. Expression θ may be thought of as the ratio of internal private production costs to external private production costs.
If profits are to be equal across systems, and both are equal to zero given free entry, then θ = 
Only two of L1-L3 are independent, and any two solve to identify an equilibrium pair 
Characterizing Equilibrium
To better understand where L1-L3 could intersect, differentiate each in variables Q and µ :
Furthermore, at any given point ( , ) Q µ , / 0 Q P P < , and so
This means that if, say, 1 L (for a given value of * I ) and 2 L cross at all, then they cross just once. Comparing the two zero profit curves, we have
that is, the elasticity of production with respect to disease severity in the closed system is less (greater) than that in the open system.
An example is provided in Figure 1 , where a single crossing point exists (all three curves must cross there) and this NE crossover point is at
In it we have made FIGURE 1. Heterogeneous system equilibrium the assumption that
A concern with understanding Figure 1 is whether the solution is unique, stable, and
interior. There may not be an interior solution * I to equation L1; there may be multiple solutions; and a solution may not be locally stable, that is, robust to a local perturbation. the open system or all use the closed system. In this case, an increase in w (e.g., a perhead tax at barn auction sales) either has no effect or it causes a discrete switch from solu- Proposition 4 raises the possibility that a rapid change in the structure of animal production arises from a modest change in the price environment. The elasticity condition that to a production function and so we cannot pursue the idea of eradication in a formal manner.
Welfare
As the NE settled upon is not necessarily optimal when multiple equilibria exist, our interest in this section is to establish how to arrive at a superior equilibrium. To understand the equilibrium sought, note that, under free entry, fatteners receive no economic surplus. All surplus accrues to consumers, and so social surplus increases in equilibrium
is not an NE, it is preferred to any interior NE because equation (6) The prescription to ban trade should not be taken literally. The real issue is the degree of openness of the market-level production system. Quarantine laws and other movement controls are intermediate approaches to reducing system openness. In addition, an information system can be viewed as a substitute for movement controls.
A concern that remains is to characterize when the open system is optimal. This is true whenever 
Internal Management of Communicable Disease Risk
In addition to inter-farm disease externalities, there are also intra-farm communicable disease problems. In order to understand better the economics of intra-farm communicable disease problems, we will ignore inter-farm externalities for the remainder of the paper. The central trade-off will be between technical scale economies in fattening and the risk in large feedlots that some animal may cause lot-wide damage.
FIGURE 3. When feeder trade is optimal, unique equilibrium occurs
Our basic template in modeling firm-level production under communicable disease risk is Kremer's (1993) O-ring production function. Ignoring disease costs for the moment, the technical cost of fattening q animals is given by the twice continuously differentiable function ( ):
There is a positive probability that a contagious disease affects the production unit. For simplicity we assume that if any animal becomes infected then all animals in the unit become infected. If infected, then the magnitude of loss per animal is δ . The probability that one animal does not become infected is Rather, growers recognize the inefficiency and never actually make the inappropriate placement.
In general, and regardless of how many health classes exist or how many productionfattening lots are under consideration, it can readily be shown that an exchange similar to that supporting inequality (11) always generates an increase in expected revenue for the same level of cost. This means that it is always efficient to exchange a lower-risk animal initially in a lower exposure lot for a higher-risk animal initially in a higher exposure lot.
This process will continue until lots have become, as far as possible, sorted by health class. 
When ( )
A q is decreasing and convex, then ( ) U q is the sum of a decreasing, convex function and increasing, concave function ( ) S q . One cannot be a priori sure that any local minimum is a global minimum. Even if ( ) A q is U-shaped (i.e., basin-shaped with interior minimum), one can only be sure that the minimizer of ( ) U q is to the left of the minimizer of ( ) A q . Figure 4 decomposes the unit cost function into unit technical cost and unit disease cost. Function ( ) A q is decreasing at 0 q = and convex on [0, ) q ∈ ∞ with interior minimum. But when p is comparatively low, then ( ) U q is increasing for low positive lot scale before peaking and assuming convex curvature at higher lot scale. As drawn, isolation minimizes unit cost. When p is comparatively high, then ( ) U q , as drawn, is decreasing at 0 q = and convex on [0, ) q ∈ ∞ with interior minimum. There are many other forms that ( ) U q might take.
Interior Lot Scale
In order to rule out the isolation lot scale solution, we assert two related requirements.
Assumption 1. ( )
U q is strictly convex in q , that is, 
FIGURE 4. Decomposition of unit cost function for fattening
The convexity assumption ensures that any solution is a unique, global equilibrium.
As we have already seen, the convexity condition is less likely to apply when p is comparatively small. Upon differentiating, unit-cost-minimizing lot scale (13) At high values of q, unit cost must become concave because ( ) U q increases toward as-
From equation (15) The situation is depicted in Figure 5 . On the vertical axis at 1 y = then is unbounded because p is sufficiently large that disease loss is again acceptably low at large lot scale.
Feeder Animal Price
The feeder animal price-health class schedule is the Ricardian rent 
Information and Bayesian Conditioning
Quality of information will affect lot scale. To show how, let purchasers and sellers have symmetric but imperfect information on two animal types, as given in Table 4 (1 ) ( (1 ) [ (1 ) (1 ) smaller. The case of ( , ) + − is ambiguous.
Dependent Disease Risks
To this point we have assumed that the health probabilities for animals in a given lot are independent. We relax this assumption by allowing for idiosyncratic and systemic components to an animal's health probabilities. The probability that one animal does not be-
, is decomposed into a systemic component ν and an independent idiosyncratic component ϕ , p νϕ = . The relative sizes of the multiplied probabilities may be viewed as being determined by the degree of similarity in backgrounds of the lot animals; if very similar, then ν is low and ϕ is high for a given value of p .
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At a specified value of p , primary disease source risk is said to be fixed. For systemic component ν , one cannot attribute disease risk to any particular animal. The systemic components are perfectly correlated across the lot while the idiosyncratic components are independent. The probability that the lot does not become infected is then
10 As ϕ increases then animals at a given health class p become more similar in the sense that most of the risk falls on common component ν . 11 The envelope theorem suggests that unit cost is decreasing in ϑ for a given value of Proposition 12 suggests that one should procure feeder stock from as similar a background, be it in nature or nurture, as possible. Livestock auctions are unlikely to perform well in that regard. Closed-system feeder stock procurement from a single-feeder animal source would perform better.
Damage Control
To model expenditures on controlling loss, let control input level x per animal be used at unit cost t . The input reduces loss in that δ is a decreasing function, ( ) 0
Then equation (12) becomes 
Second cross-derivatives are 2 ( ) / ( ) 0
The system is submodular in argument set { , , } x q t − . Standard deductions from submodularity theory support the intuition that an increase in the price of the control input decreases both input use per animal and lot scale.
Internal Production
Suppose one could produce internally such that there is zero probability of disease. ( )/ Q dw p dp * * ( , )/ dH Q p dp = . These, together with equation (13) 
Openness and Communicable Animal Diseases
To illustrate the role of openness in disease management, we consider efforts to control three categories of communicable animal disease. These are babesiasis (Texas fever) in bovines, tuberculosis (TB) in bovines, and respiratory diseases in swine. The first is tick-borne, most problematic in warmer climates, and of little health risk to humans. TB is bacterial, more difficult to detect when trading animals, and presents significant human health risks. The most troublesome swine respiratory diseases are viral diseases, which are often readily transmitted by air and do not pose significant human health risks. Each has somewhat distinct features regarding transmission and economic impacts.
Babesiasis
The ailment causes fever, jaundice, a decline in milk production, and abortion. borne. In 1892, the federal government imposed a national quarantine line above which any southern cattle moved between January 15 and November 15 had to be by rail or boat and for immediate slaughter.
Bovine Tuberculosis
Unlike babesiasis, bovine TB is communicable to humans, and that fact was a determining issue in prioritizing the disease for eradication. Among cattle, it can be spread through bacterial contamination of water, bedding, feed, and shared air. Productivity losses typically amount to a 10 to 25 percent reduction in output from infected animals.
At the herd level, the disease generally spreads through stock purchases, although herd contiguity (i.e., density of production), a common water supply, and wildlife vectors are also factors. Commencing in 1917, large resources were devoted by the U.S. government to eradicate the disease in bovines. Measures included a testing program, quarantine for animals entering the country, and movement controls on animals inside the United States, as well as a tracking system for moved animals (Smith 1958; Myers and Steele 1969) .
Test positive animals were destroyed, and this number peaked at 377,000 in 1935.
The early focus of the campaign was on breeding herds, in part because of the mobility of high-quality progeny. Breeding herds declared as TB-free were designated as accredited.
Accreditation was later extended to counties, and a market premium for live animals from these herds and counties provided private incentives beyond direct productivity effects to secure accreditation. State-level legislation required out-of-state animals to pass tests before they were allowed entry. In-state testing regimes were put in place, reactors were slaughtered with compensation, and herds with reactors were quarantined pending subsequent tests. Opposition among some farmers was intense, indicating the gap between private and public benefits. The program is viewed as a great success and all counties in the United
States had infection rates below 0.5 percent by 1941. Even ignoring the reduction of bovine TB infections in the human population, it was held that the program benefits far exceeded program costs in securing agricultural productivity.
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It was recognized early in federal animal disease eradication endeavors that system closure through movement control was critical. The bovine TB program illustrates two related central themes in the approach generally taken: imposing movement controls and designing robust information systems. Movement controls and information systems are to some extent substitutes. Broad movement controls may be necessary if the extent of a disease is known with a low degree of certainty. But the resulting cost would be high when there are strong private incentives to move animals. A good information system may allow for targeted movement controls at low cost. The most important feature of an information system is the quality of testing procedures, and a TB test (though imperfect) for use on farms became available in 1892 (Myers and Steele 1969) .
Swine Respiratory Diseases
Many swine diseases are contagious but transferable only by direct animal contact, as in our intra-farm model. The movement of animals between herds is an important condition for the spread of these diseases. But gains from trade are forgone when limits are placed on animal movements, while losses from restricting breeding selection are also important. Many breeding farms have moved to closed systems, while fattening farms remain relatively open (Plonait 2001) . The introduction of new genetic material in breeding farms occurs by means of artificial insemination, embryo-transfers, and pre-natal harvest of piglets to ensure specified pathogen-free animals.
Besides the transmission of infection from other the animals, infections may occur through manure spread on land, wild animals, feed, and human contact. Aerial transmission is important for certain viral infections. Several costly respiratory diseases in swine illustrate the issues we have discussed; See Table 5. 14 Enzootic pneumonia (EP) can take a subclinical form up to an acute form with significant economic losses to the farm. It is often caused by the introduction of new animals in existing herds. EP can also be transferred at a distance in aerosol. This mode of transmission is highly dependent on farm and regional stocking density. Actinobacillus-pleuropneumonia, first discovered in 1964, is similar to EP. Infection mostly occurs by buying new animals but also through passive infection by clothing and airborne transmission. Its chronic form is often present in fattening farms and closed breeder-fattening systems.
Swine influenza has been endemic in the United States since it was first observed in 1918. Its later emergence in East Asia, South America, and Europe was likely through imported breeding pigs. It is introduced by the purchase of latent infected animals, but outbreaks usually occur only under adverse weather conditions. Porcine reproductive and respiratory syndrome is viral and was first reported in 1987 in the United States. The first European outbreak occurred in 1990 in Germany, and from there it spread rapidly throughout Europe (Nodelijk et al. 2003) . 
Concluding Comments
In this article, we have identified some ways in which the extent of openness in an animal production system can affect system performance. Closed systems that forgo potential gains from trade can be more efficient when the risk of losses from communicable disease is significant. When communicable disease gives rise to inter-farm externalities, then temporary (at the least) public action to close the system may be necessary to improve industry performance. Indeed, to the extent that regional advantages in feed costs encourage feeder trade, our first model suggests that cheap feed may reduce competitiveness for the system as a whole. If advantage is to be taken of cheap feed, then the relatively closed contractual approach adopted among U.S. hogs may perform better than the more open feeder cattle trade approach even when price discovery is impeded.
Our model of intra-farm effects showed how communicable disease considerations impede exploitation of technical economies of scale. The relationship between health class and scale may not be simple. However, the reasonableness of the negative exponential technology suggests that when health class is sufficiently large then scale should increase with improved health class. It should not be surprising that industrial approaches to animal production, with high fixed cost capital requirements and scale economies, place emphasis on procuring animals of consistently superior health. Optimal lot scale may not otherwise be sufficiently large to clear a profit.
A common thread running through the analysis is the relevance of information in improving performance. Openness and information can hardly be considered separately.
If traditional open approaches to animal production are to remain competitive then the genuine information problems attending open systems must be solved. If a production system is to exploit the potential advantages of trade then comprehensive animal information infrastructure will be necessary. Indeed, plural information sets may be required.
Governments need information to manage animal and human health externalities. Producers and processors have additional information needs that are unlikely to be met by any government endeavors. Record keeping can be burdensome, so any government system should be capable of extension to accommodate private sector needs.
Endnotes
1. Sumner (2003) explains in depth the public good aspects of agricultural diseases. Kuchler and Hamm (2000) , in which the issue is a bounty on reporting scrapie infections.
A notable exception is
3. See Biggs (1985) on practical motivation for these monotonicity assumptions. Notice that our model has trivial spatial structure in that all production in the market is equally exposed to any given disease outbreak. Even so, the classical Reed-Frost algorithm for disease contagion is not spatial either (Thrusfield 1995) . While more spatial structure would be critical in any epidemiological model seeking prediction, it is less relevant to a qualitative economic analysis of contagion. A significant deficiency in our model is that system openness is attached to a production function.
But if a disease can be eradicated then an open system can have low disease incidence. Even then, the more open the system, the greater the risk of a subsequent outbreak.
This means that [ ]
M I is not flat in metric space neighborhoods. Our analysis could include such situations, but no additional insights would result.
5. They are unstable to a perturbance in one direction, i.e., either unstable when I increases or unstable when I decreases.
6. While we use calculus to optimize, it is recognized that lot scale takes integer values. Exponential transformation 10. If the lot consists of two animals, then there is probability 1 ν − that both succumb to a common cause. For each animal also, there is the probability 1 ϕ − that the particular animal succumbs to an idiosyncratic cause and then contaminates the other.
The three events are independent and the probability that none occur is 2 p νϕ ϕ = .
11. Caution is warranted when interpreting systemic risk in this model. As the value of ν decreases, animals become more similar in risk exposure but lot systemic risk decreases.
12. The expression 2 ( ) / 0 d U dqdx ⋅ ≤ suggests that farm-level conditions under which lot scale is high should also tend to be conditions under which x is high. A survey by APHIS (2000) found that large cattle feedlots ( ≥ 8,000 head) spent an average of $16.26 per sick animal on (often communicable) respiratory diseases, compared with an average of $11.09 per sick animal in smaller feedlots ( < 8,000 head but ≥ 1,000 head). For digestive problems (excluding non-eaters) costs per sick animal were about the same: $6.27 on large lots and $6.14 on smaller lots. For problems of the central nervous system problems, large lots spent $11.29 per sick animal while smaller lots spent $11.61 per sick animal.
13. See p. 134 of Myers and Steele 1969. 14. The descriptions are largely from information in Zimmermann and Plonait 2001.
15. All-in/all-out management means that all animals are removed from a lot prior to restocking. The facilities are then cleaned and disinfected before restocking occurs.
